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Exb.·aterritorial Jurisdiction and Jurisdiction Following
Forcible Abduction: A New Israeli Precedent
in International Law
An Israeli military court recently convicted Faik Bulut, a twentythree-year-old Turkish citizen, of the offense of b,elonging to Al-.
Fatah in Lebanon and Syria and sentenced him to seven years in
prison.1 Bulut was captured in February 1972 during an Israeli raid
319. See text accompanying notes 304-08 supra.
320. Id.
321. See note 305 supra.
322. See text accompanying notes 300-03 supra.
323. See text accompanying notes 265-68 supra.
324. See text accompanying notes 249-58 supra.
325. See text accompanying notes 269-70 supra.
326. See text accompanying notes 271-94 supra.
32'7. See text accompanying notes 272-85 supra.
328. See text accompanying notes 282-83 supra.
329. See text accompanying notes 286-88 supra.
330. See text accompanying notes 289-94 supra.
I

'
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I

1. Judgment of Aug. 7, 1973, slip op. at l, 8 (Military Court, Lod, Israel, in Hebrew)
[hereinafter Judgment]. A second specification, for which Bulut was sentenced to a
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100 miles into Lebanon.2 Ten fedayeen, who were captured in
Lebanon later in 1972, were scheduled to follow Bulut into court
to be tried for the same offense. 8 These are the first cases4 to be tried
under a 1972 amendment to the Israeli Penal Law (Offenses Committed Abroad), which states in part: "The courts in Israel are competent to try under Israeli law a person who has committed abroad
an act which would be an offense if it had been committed in Israel
and ,;vhich harmed or was intended to harm the State of Israel, its
security, property or economy or its transport or communications
links with other countries."5
The trials raise two important issues in international law. First, is
there a substantive basis under international law for the exercise of
jurisdiction by the state of Israel despite the fact that the offenses
were committed by nonnationals outside Israel? Second, is that exercise of jurisdiction consistent with international law despite the fact
that the defendants were brought to Israel in a manner not condoned
by international law? While these two issues will be analyzed
separately, they are related: Both involve the relative freedom of an
individual from the control of foreign legal systems. 0
concurrent term of four years, charged him with receiving weapons training. Judgment,
supra, at 1, 8·9.
2. TIME MAGAZINE, Aug. 20, 1973, at 31.
3. Id.
4. A more celebrated case might have arisen under this law had two Palestinian
leaders not narrowly escaped being aboard the airplane, chartered by Iraqi Airlines,
that was diverted to Israel by Israeli military aircraft last August, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11,
1973, at 1, col. 3 (late city ed.).
5. Passed by the Knesset on the 6th Nisan, 5732 (March 21, 1972), [5732 (1972)]
Se/er Ha•Chukkim 52, amending Penal Law Revision (Offenses Committed Abroad)
Law 5716-1955, [5716 (1955)] Se/er Ha•Chukkim 7, IO Laws of the State of Israel 7
[hereinafter Amendment to the Offenses Committed Abroad Law]. In the Knesset these
was an effort to stress the consistency of the provisions of the amendment with international law. The Minister of Justice, in introducing the bill, noted 19 nations that
accept principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction, 13 of which were asserted to have
statutes similar to the Israeli statute. Diverey•Ha,.Knesset 2509 (Debates of the Knesset,
in Hebrew), May 25, 1971. However, some provisions of these statutes have not been
greatly used. See text accompanying notes 3844 infra.
6. The domestic constitutionality of the Israeli statute and the validity of the con•
victions under the terms of the statute itself will be assumed; no attempt will be made
to discuss those issues. The possibility that Bulut was a prisoner of war will also be
left for other discussions. The Israeli military court found that Bulut was not a
prisoner of war under article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, opened for signature August 12, 1949, [1956] 6 U.S.T. 3316,
T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, and that therefore the provisions of chapter
III of that Convention (Penal and Disciplinary Sanctions) did not apply, In introducing the amendment under which Bulut was convicted to the Knesset and stressing its
accordance with international law, the Israeli Minister of Justice noted that there
was no intention to give competence to Israeli courts to try, for instance, Egyptian
soldiers brought to Israel or representatives of weapons factories that sell weapons to
Egypt or Jordan, exercises of jurisdiction that would be contrary to international Jaw.
Diverey-Ha-Knesset 2522 (Debates of the Knesset, in Hebrew), May 25, 1971.
C\
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The first issue, whether there is a substantive basis for Israeli
jurisdiction, requires an examination of the four principles that have
been widely recognized as bases for penal jurisdiction.7 The most
universally accepted of these is the principle of territoriality,8 jurisdiction determined by reference to the place where the offense was
committed. This principle derives from the concepts of territorial
sovereignty and the equality of states.9 Its fundamental justification is
that the "territorial sovereign has the strongest interest, the greatest
facilities, and the most powerful instruments for repressing crimes,
whether committed by native-born subjects, or by domiciled aliens,
in his territory."10 An extension, or more accurately a subcategory, of
the territorial principle is the "objective territorial" principle. Since
an act that is initiated in one state and has an effect in a second state
is deemed to have been committed in part in the second state, the
second state may have jurisdiction over an offender who has never
left the first state.11
7. See R. MERLE &: A. Vrru, TRArrE DE DRorr CRIMINEL 198-201 (1967); REs'fATEMENT
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 10-19 (1965) [hereinafter
REs'fATE!llENT]; Empson, The Application of Criminal Law to Offenses Committed
Outside the Jurisdiction, 6 AI-r. CRIM. L.Q. 32 (1967); Feller, Jurisdiction over Offenses
with a Foreign Element, in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 5, 17-34 (M. Bassiouni &:
V. Nanda ed. 1973); [Harvard] Research in International Law, Introductory Comment,
Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AI-r. J. INTL. LAW 443, 445 (Supp. 1935); Sarkar,
The Proper Law of Crime in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 50,
50-76 (G. Mueller &: E. Wise ed. 1965); authorities cited in id. at 129-30. Other "princi•
pies of jurisdiction," such as the "objective territorial" principle, see note 11 infra, are,
in essence, extensions of these four.
Probably the most authoritative source in this area is [Harvard] Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INTL. LAW 435 (Supp.
1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research]. After the League of Nations Assembly called for
a "Conference for the Codification of International Law" (which subsequently met at
The Hague, March-April, 1930), the faculty of the Harvard Law School, in 1927, undertook to organize a Research in International Law for the purpose of preparing drafts
of international conventions on subjects selected by the Assembly to be dealt with at
the conference. The method followed by the American Law Institute was adopted for
the Research, the work of which progressed despite lack of significant achievement in
actual codification. By 1935, ten conventions on various areas of international law
had been drafted, including the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to
Crime. The results of this particular effort were published in the 1935 Supplement to
the American Journal of International Law, which includes the Draft Convention,
an Introductory Comment, a Bibliography, and extensive comments detailing the
means and sources of the provisions of each article. The Harvard Research has been
quite influential in the understanding of jurisdiction with respect to crime. The
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, published by the American Law Institute after ten years of research and revision, purports to restate the law and therefore does not contain the occasional attempts at improvement of existing practice that
are found in Harvard Research.
8, See R.EsTATE!llENT, supra note 7, §§ 17-19; Harvard Research, supra note 7, at
480-500.
9. See Sarkar, supra note 7, at 51.
10. G. LEWIS, FOREIGN JURISDlctION AND THE EXTRADITION OF CRIMINALS 30 (1859),
quoted in Harvard Research, supra note 7, at 483.
11. United States and British cases that support the "objective territorial" principle
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The second generally accepted principle is that of nationality,12
jurisdiction determined by the nationality of the person committing
the offense. This principle is based on the sovereignty of the state18
and the close legal relationship of the national to his state. 14
The third principle is the protective principle,10 which determines jurisdiction by reference to the state whose national interests are endangered by the offense. Although the origins of this
principle date back to the Italian cities of the 15th and 16th centuries, it has more recently had a rapid development.16 Countries
that derive their jurisprudence from the English common law were,
until recently, particularly reluctant to use this principle as a basis
of jurisdiction.17 Its theoretical basis is the right of self-defense, 18 but
are cited in Harvard Research, supra note 7, at 488-91. United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), is frequently cited to support that principle
because of its broad language that "it is settled law ••• that any state may impose
liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders
that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these lia•
bilities other states will ordinarily recoguizc." 148 F.2d at 443. The particular issue
involved was whether Aluminium, Ltd., a Canadian corporation formed to take over
the non-U.S. properties of Alcoa, had violated section I of the Sherman Act by forming an "alliance" with other foreign producers of aluminum ingot, When considering
the above quoted language, hO\vever, one should take into account the limited fact
situation. The stockholders of Aluminium were mainly U.S. citizens, 148 F.2d at 439-40,
Aluminium had strong ties with Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 439-40, and there was a factual
finding of intended effects on aluminum prices in the United States. 148 F.2d at 444.
12. See R.FsrATEMENT, supra note 7, §§ 26-32; Harvard Research, supra note 7,
at 519-42.
13. See Sarkar, supra note 7, at 6_1-67,
14. Various grounds reflecting these relationships are
(I) that since the State is composed of nationals, who arc its members, the
State's law should apply to them wherever they may be; (2) that the State is
primarily interested in and affected by the conduct of its nationals; (3) that
penal laws are of a personal character, like those governing civil status, and that,
while only reasons d'ordre public justify their application to aliens within the
territory, they apply normally to nationals of the State everywhere: (4) that the
protection of nationals abroad gives rise to a reciprocal duty of obedience; (5)
that any offense committed by a national abroad causes a disturbance of the
social and moral order in the State of his allegiance; (6) that the national knows
best his own State's penal law, that he is more likely to be fairly and effectively
tried under his own State's law and by his own State's courts, and that the most
appropriate jurisdiction from the point of view of the accused should be considered • • • ; (7) that without tlie exercise of such jurisdiction many crimes
would go unpunished, especially where States refuse to extradite their nationals.
Harvard Research, supra note 7, at 519-20. Some nations have extended this principle
to domiciled aliens, see Harvard Research, supra, at 533; In re Friedman, [1947] Ann.
Dig. 127 (No. 59) (Cour de Cassation, Belg., 1947), and to employees of the state.
Harvard Research, supra, at 539-41. Section l of the Penal Law Revision (Offenses
Committed Abroad) Law 5716-1955, [5716 (1955)] Sefer Ha-Chukkim 7, 10 Laws of the
State of Israel 7, asserts jurisdiction over nationals, residents, or public servants com•
mitting such offenses as bribery, deceit, and extortion.
15. See R.FsrATEMENT, supra note 7, § 33; Harvard Research, supra note 7, at 543-63,
16. See Harvard Research, supra note 7, at 543; Sarkar, supra note 7, at 68.
17. See Harvard Research, supra note 7, at 543-44; Sarkar, supra note 7, at 68-69.
18. Sarkar, supra note 7, at 68. See also Explanatory Note to the Amendment to the
Offenses Committed Abroad Law (in Hebrew) published in Hatta'ot-Chok No. 944 of
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the practical justification for the protective principle is the inadequacy of national legislation in punishing offenses committed within
the territory against the vital interests of foreign states.19
The fourth recognized principle, that of universality,20 gives
jurisdiction to the state that has custody of a person who has committed certain universally recognized. crimes. The principle originated when piracy was a menace to international commerce, and it
was justified by the saying that "the pirate who preyed upon all alike
was the enemy of all alike."21 In addition, most acts of piracy occurred
on the high seas, where no state had territorial jurisdiction. The
universality principle has more recently been asserted to cover other
delicta juris gentium (crimes against the law of mankind), notably
war crimes.22
Of course, not all of these principles apply to the case of Bulut
and the ten fedayeen. Because the alleged offenses were committed
by non-Israelis in Lebanon and Syria, the nationality principle cannot be invoked by Israel. Nor can the territorial principle be applied,
unless in the form of the objective territorial principle, which would
require that an effect in Israel be found. Such an effect, in these
cases, could only be on the security interest of the state as a whole,
5731 (1971), at 232 [hereinafter Explanatory Note]; R. MERLE&: A. Vrru, supra note 7, at
216.
19, Harvard Research, supra note 7, at 552.
20. See REsrATEMENT, supra note 7, §§ 34-35; Harvard Research, supra note 7, at
563-92.
21. Harvard Research, supra note 7, at 566.
22. See text accompanying notes 59-67 infra. A fifth principle, the passive personality principle, by which jurisdiction is determined merely by reference to the nationality of the victim, has been asserted by some nations. In the famous case of the
S.S. "Lotus," [1927) P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, [1927-28) Ann. Dig. 153 (No. 98), the
Permanent Court of International Justice reserved its opinion on the validity of
the passive personality principle. [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, at 22-23. In the same
Israeli Amendment to the Offenses Committed Abroad Law, supra note 5, Israel
claimed jurisdiction over an act abroad "which would be an offense if it had been
committed in Israel and which harmed or was intended to harm the life, person,
health, freedom or property of a national or resident of Israel." Section 2B(a) of the
Amendment to the Offenses Committed Abroad Law, supra. Although section 2B(b)
limits the application of section 2B(a) to acts that are offenses both in Israel and in
the state of commission, Professor Dinstein of Tel-Aviv University has criticized this
provision. Dinstein, The Amendment to the Offenses Committed Abroad Law (in
Hebrew), 2 EUNEY MISHPAT 829, 830-34 (1972). While he would recognize the passive
personality principle if it takes into account various aspects of a particular case,
citing factors listed by M. Altamira in his dissenting opinion in the "Lotus" case,
[1927) P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, at 102, Professor Dinstein criticized section 2B(a) of the
amendment as going far beyond any recognized limited passive personality principle.
A full discussion of whether this principle is consistent with international law
is beyond the scope of this Note, but it is not widely recognized. Harvard Research,
supra note 7, at 445. It is also subject to the criticism that a visitor to a foreign nation
would "carry" the laws of his nation around with him. See Letter from Mr. Bayard,
Secretary of State, to Mr. Connery, Charge to Mexico, [1887) FOREIGN REL. U.S. 751
(1888), 2 J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 232-40 (1906).
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and few cases have relied on such an effect.23 If such an effect were
found, the state asserting jurisdiction could doubtless also base its
claim on the protective theory, which covers offenses against the
security of the state but does not require a factual finding of an
effect within the state. The Israeli prosecutors and courts have not
based their claims to jurisdiction on the objective territorial theory.
The provision of the amendment under which Bulut was tried was
intended to broaden Israeli protective jurisdiction,24 and the military
court relied on the protective principle in upholding the validity of
the statute.25 The court expressly refrained from relying on the
universality principle, but the prosecution and defense counsel
argued as if it were an asserted basis of jurisdiction.20 Because notions
based on the universality principle are often expressed when cases
such as that involving Bulut are discussed-as demonstrated by the
actual argument in that case-it is necessary to examine the underlying rationale and the possible applicability of the universality principle, as well as the protective principle relied upon by the Israeli
court.
The protective principle is the most likely source of substantive
jurisdiction in these cases. The Harvard Research Draft on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime27 defines protective jurisdiction as follows:
Article 7-Protection-Security of the State
A state has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed
outside its territory by an alien against the security, territorial integrity or political independence of that State, provided that the act
23. In Ex parte Savarkar, [1910] 2 K.B. 1056 (C.A.), a British subject was extradited
to India for offenses under the Indian Penal Code, including seditious acts in England,
but some acts in India were also charged. The Court of Appeals discussed only
whether it had jurisdiction in light of the particular procedural facts of the case and
did not discuss the merits of the issue of Indian jurisdiction. In Judgment of Dec. 15,
1908, ZEITSCHRIFT FUR INTERNATIONALES R.EcHT 235 (Niemeyer ed. 1909) (Reichsgericht,
Ger.), an offense involving the distribution of pamphlets in Austria gave Germany jurisdiction because it was deemed to have continued in Germany when the recipients of
the pamphlets returned there, as the defendant had intended. In addition, the defendant
was a German national who distributed the books in Austria expressly in order to
escape punishment in Germany.
24. Explanatory Note, supra note 18; Dinstein, supra note 22, at 835.
25. Judgment, supra note l, at 3. The court also relied on the principle that an
Israeli court must apply the laws of the Knesset where a clear conflict exists between
that law and a rule of international law. Judgment, supra, at 2, In support the court
cited G. SHARP & B. GALPIN, MA.xWELL ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 154 (10th ed.
1953), and Attorney General v. Eichmann, 36 IL.R. 277, 280 (Supreme Court of Israel
sitting as a Court of Criminal Appeal, 1962), which relied on English precedent.
United States courts recognize a similar principle. See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion Case,
130 U.S. 581, 600-03 (1889) (Chinese exclusion law violating earlier treaty upheld);
Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461, 465-67 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Congress may legislate in
breach of United Nations Charter obligations).
26. Judgment, supra note 1, at 4.
27. Harvard Research, supra note 7, at 435-65.
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or omission which constitutes the crime was not committed in exercise of a liberty guaranteed the alien by the law of the place where
it was committed.
Article 8-Protection-Counterfeiting
A state has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed
outside its territory by an alien which consists of a falsification or
counterfeiting, or an uttering of falsified copies or counterfeits, of
the seals, currency, instruments of credit, stamps, passports, or public
documents, issued by that state or under its authority.28
The American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law defines the protective principle in a slightly different
way:
§ 33. Protective Principle
(1) A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching
legal consequences to conduct outside its territory that threatens its
security as a state or the operation of its governmental functions,
provided the conduct is generally recognized as a crime under the
law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
(2) Conduct referred to in Subsection (I) includes in particular
the counterfeiting of the state's seals and currency, and the falsification of its official documents.29
The distinction between offenses involving the security of the
state and those involving government administrative functions,
emphasized by their separation into two articles in the Harvard
Research Draft, is justified because offenses on the order of counterfeiting are almost everywhere regarded as harmful, 30 whereas offenses
involving the security of one state may be allowed or even encouraged in another because of the political orientation of the offenses.
The protective principle has been recognized in the United States
with regard to government administrative functions, 31 and the application of that principle with regard to counterfeiting has been
incorporated into a League of Nations convention32 that had been
ratified or acceded to by over thirty states as of 1960.33
28. Id. at 440.
29. REsTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 33, at 92.
30. Harvard Research, supra note 7, at 562.
31. See United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968) (alien in Canada who
swore falsely in applying for U.S. visa violated 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (1970) and was held
subject to U.S. jurisdiction under the protective principle); Rocha v. United States,
288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961) (aliens charged with conspiracy to defraud the United
States by falsely claiming while abroad to be married to U.S. citizens held subject to
U.S. jurisdiction under protective principle); cases cited in Harvard Research, supra
note 7, at 544-45.
32. International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency,
April 20, 1929, art. 9, 112 L.N.T.S. 371.
33. [1960] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 5 (CMD. 932) at 30-31.
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The protective principle with regard to the security of the state
(hereinafter the protective (security) principle) is recognized primarily through its widespread assertion by non-Anglo Saxon nations,
many of which have passed penal laws that provide for jurisdiction
over crimes committed by foreigners abroad against what is, in one
formulation or another, the "security of the state."84 The French
Code of Criminal Procedure, for instance, provides: "Every foreigner
who outside the territory of the Republic renders himself guilty,
either as perpetrator or as accomplice, of a felony or misdemeanor
against the security of the state ... may be prosecuted and tried according to the provisions of French law if he is arrested in France or
if the Government obtains his extradition."85 In addition, the Bustamante Code, Convention on Private International Law, in force in
fifteen Latin American Republics as of 1950,86 provides: "Article 305.
Those committing an offense against the internal or external security
of a contracting State or against its public credit, whatever the nationality or domicile of the delinquent person, are subject in a foreign country to the penal laws of each contracting State. " 87
However, jurisdiction over foreigners for acts undertaken abroad
that were harmful to the security of the state has actually been exercised only in a series of French cases arising out of World War I.88 In
34. Penal codes of over 40 countries that have such provisions are cited in Harvard
Research, supra note 7, at 547-51. More recent provisions are cited in Sahovic &:
Bishop, The Authority of the State: Its Range with Respect to Persons and Places, in
MANUAL OF PUBUC INTERNATIONAL I.Aw 311, 363-64 (M. Sprensen ed. 1968); Feller,
supra note 7, at 27 n.19. One example is the Italian Penal Code (1930), as translated
in Harvard Research, supra note 7, at 548:
Article 7. A national or foreigner who commits any one o.E the following of•
fenses in foreign territory shall be punished under Italian law: (I) Crimes against
the personality of the State •••• Article 8. A national or foreigner who commits
in foreign territory a political crime other than those specified in (I) of the
preceding Article shall be punished under Italian Jaw. • • • For the purposes of
penal law, any crime which injures a political interest of the State, or a political
right of a national, is a political crime. An ordinary crime, determined wholly
or in part by political motives, is likewise considered to be a P,Olitical crime.
Another is the Venezuelan Penal Code (1926), as translated in Harvard Research,
supra, at 548: "Article 4. There are subject to prosecution in Venezuela and shall be
punished according to the Venezuelan penal law: • • • (2) The foreign subjects or
citizens who in a foreign country commit any crime against the security of the Republic • • • ." A third is the Ethiopian Penal Law (1957), as translated in Sahovi6 &:
Bishop, supra, at 363: "Article 13. The present code is applicable to all persons who,
abroad, have committed one of the offenses against the Sovereign and the Empire, its
servants, its integrity, its institutions, or its essential interests, provided in , • •
[specifying provisions of the code]."
35. C. PRo. PEN. art. 694 (13e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1971), cited in Sahovi6 &:
Bishop, supra note 34, at 363. The article is derived from article 7 o.E the old French
Code of Criminal Procedure, cited in Harvard Research, supra note 7, at 546.
36. Sahovi6 and Bishop, supra note 34, at 363; 34 Pan-Am. Union L. &: T.S. iv (page
number supplied) (1950).
37. February 20, 1928, 86 L.N.T.S. Ill, 332.
38. See cases cited in Harvard Research, supra note 7, at 549.
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Wechsler3 9 jurisdiction was found to try a Rumanian (taken into
French custody in Paris at a time when the German Army was deep
into France) for corresponding in Switzerland and Germany with the
enemies of France. In In re Urios 40 the conviction in French Algeria
of a Spaniard was upheld. The defendant, the captain of a Spanish
merchant ship, was convicted of maintaining correspondence in
Spain with the enemies of France during the war. In In re Bayot41
the defendant, a Belgian, was charged with having procured in Belgium metals and objects of all kinds for the German authorities, and
with having assisted German officers and policemen to discover
articles concealed by their owners. The French court held that
Article 7 of the Code d'Instruction criminelle, "based on the right of
legitimate defence, gives the French courts jurisdiction to take cognisance of crimes aimed at the security of the State committed outside
French territory by a foreigner who has been arrested in France.
• • • " 42 Apart from these French cases, nations have generally not
exercised jurisdiction over nonnationals acting abroad to the detriment of the security of the state, despite claims in statutes and dicta43
that a state has such jurisdiction. Even in the early days of the Third
Reich, the National Socialist regime in Germany refrained from
invoking the protective jurisdiction asserted in German statutes,
despite frequent opportunities to do so.44
The French assertions of jurisdiction have been criticized as "inadmissible in principle and in excess of anything which international
law permits."45 A French commentator has pointed out the inconsistency that a soldier of an enemy power fighting France is not in
violation of the law while a national of a neutral state who is acting
in a neutral state may be in violation of the law.46
39. Conseil de Guerre de Paris, July 20, 1917, 44 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL
1745.
40, [1919-22) Ann. Dig. 107 (No. 70) (Cour de Cassation Criminel, France, 1920).
41. [1923-24] Ann. Dig. 109 (No. 54) (Cour de Cassation, France, 1923).
42. [1923-24] Ann. Dig. at 109 (No. 54).
43. See, e.g., Nusselein v. Belgian State, [1950] Ann. Dig. 136 (No. 35) (Cour de Cassation, Belg., 1950) (acts committed in Belgium); In re Friedman, [1947) Ann. Dig. 127
(No. 59) (Cour de Cassation, Belg., 1947) (defendant, although an alien, was a resident
of Belgium before the war and therefore was considered to owe a duty to Belgium).
44. Preuss, International Law and German Legislation on Political Crime, 20
TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOClETY 85, 100 (1935).
45. Harvard Research, supra note 7, at 558. Professor Garcia-Mora has described
these cases as "almost bordering on absurdity." Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction over
Foreigners for Treason and Offenses Against the Safety of the State Committed upon
Foreign Territory, 19 U. PITT. L. REv. 567, 579 (1958).
46. Code Penal Annote, art. 76, No. 3 (Gar~n), quoted in Harvard Research,
supra note 7, at 558-59. It might be argued in reply that, while exercising jurisdiction
over an enemy soldier would serve no international purpose, the exercise of jurisdiction over individual nationals of a neutral state may prevent confrontation with the
neutral state itself and thus help to keep neutral states out of wars. Such an argument
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Professor Garcia-Mora has pointed out the desirability of "substantial restrictions on the exercise of protective jurisdiction."47 He
discusses three rights relied on by those who favor protective jurisdiction: the right of self-defense, the asserted sovereign right of a state
to determine the scope of its penal law, and the right of a state to be
secure from the disruption of its institutions.48 He attacks the
justification based on the right of self-defense because of the likelihood of unjust, politically oriented judgments in such cases and because the concept of self-defense theoretically allows undue discretion
to the prosecuting state. He also notes the paradox of talking of
"self-defense in the presence of a wrongful fait accompli." 40 Professor
Garcia-Mora finds the second justification, that a state has a sovereign
right to determine the scope of its penal law, applicable only within
the territory of the state; beyond that the question becomes one of
conflict of jurisdictions and therefore of international concern. The
third justification he finds the "most persuasive and logically consistent."50 He recognizes that the right of a state to be secure from
the disruption of its institutions is not generally protected by the
exercise of territorial jurisdiction on the part of other states. He
argues, however, that the same right implies a "duty of other States
to prevent treasonable and other harmful activities from being carried on under the protection of their territorial sovereignty."01 Only
the failure to perform this duty has given rise to the need to assert
protective jurisdiction, and Professor Garcia-Mora urges fulfillment
of this duty through domestic legislation or, preferably, an international convention.
The Harvard Research Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with
Respect to Crime, although not in this instance purporting to be a
restatement of practice,52 limits the protective (security) principle to
acts "not committed in exercise of a liberty guaranteed the alien by
the law of the place where it was committed."53 The Restatement
limits the protective principle to conduct "generally recognized as a
crime under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal
relies, however, on the perhaps unrealistic assumption that the antagonisms en•
gendered by trying the nationals of other states will be less than those engendered
by such nation-to-nation acts as economic coercion or military reprisals,
47. Garcia-Mora, supra note 45, at 589.
48. Id. at 584-88.
49. Id. at 585. The latter point is compelling only where a dangerous period, such
as World War I in the French cases, has passed; otherwise, the deterrence value of the
prosecution may be significant in spite of the "wrongful fait accompli.''
50. Id. at 587.
51. Id. at 587.
52. Harvard Research, supra note 7, at 557.
53. Id. at 543.
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systems."54 Although the two limitations differ, 55 they do indicate a
general reluctance on the part of legal scholars to recognize an unqualified protective (security) principle. The principle has rarely
been applied, and then only in cases where the prosecuting state
was at war at the time of the offense and the defendant committed
acts specifically directed against or affecting that state.56 When it is
further taken into account that even these cases were heavily
criticized, it is clear that an unlimited protective (security) principle
is not recognized in international practice.
In the current Israeli cases, the exercise of protective jurisdiction
is based on a nearly unlimited interpretation of that principle. Assuming that Lebanon guarantees at least the right to be a member
of a Palestinian organization, and that such membership is not recognized as a crime under the law of states with reasonably developed
legal systems, the offenses tried in Israel do not fall within the limitation of either the Harvard Draft or the Restatement. The defendants
there are not even charged with acts aiding a wartime enemy of the
state, as in the French cases, but rather merely with membership in
an organization. The latter offense is likely to endanger the security
of Israel only in a more indirect and insubstantial way. It is not difficult to conclude that the Israeli exercise of protective jurisdiction
in these cases sets a significant new precedent for the application of
an almost unlimited protective (security) principle.
As noted above, the prosecution and defense counsel in the Bulut
case made arguments that could only have been based on the principle of universal jurisdiction.57 The principle of universality-the
right to try, despite nationality or place of crime, merely on the
basis of custody-is recognized as applying only to crimes that affect
the international community and are against international law.58
Although universal jurisdiction over piracy has long been recognized, 59 in the period since the Niirnberg Trials,60 war crimes have
also come to be generally accepted as justifying universal jurisdic54. REsTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 33.
55. The more the term "generally recognized" is taken to mean "universally recognized,'' the more the Restatement provision would appear to offer wider protection for
possible defendants than the Harvard Research formulation. Sedition, for instance, may
not be found to be "generally recognized as a crime under the law of states that have
reasonably developed legal systems,'' while free speech or free press may not be
guaranteed by the law of the place of the commission of the crime.
56. See text accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
57. Judgment, supra note 1, at 4.
58. See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
59. See Sahovic &: Bishop, supra note 34, at 365.
60. See Garcia-Mora, Crimes Against Peace in International Law: From Nurnberg
to tlze Present, 53 KY. L.J. 35, 36-46 (1964) and authorities cited therein.

1098

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. '12:1087

tion. 61 A number of nations have also proposed or asserted universal
jurisdiction over the crimes of slave trading and traffic in women
and children.62 In addition to these widely recognized offenses, made
subject to universal jurisdiction by customary international law, the
offenses of airplane hijacking and airplane sabotage have been made
subject to a limited form of universal jurisdiction by multilateral
treaty. 68 Beyond the offenses mentioned above, universal jurisdiction
has been generally recognized only in a few rare procedural situations, 64 not relevant to the Israeli cases.
61. United Nations War Crimes Comm., 15 Law Rep. of War Crimes Trials 26
(1949). See also Attorney General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 298-304 {Supreme Court
of Israel sitting as a Court of Criminal Appeal, 1962); Carnegie, Jurisdiction over
Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, 39 BRIT. Y.B. INTL. L. 402 (1963); Cowles,
Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 177 (1945). Jurisdiction
was based on the universality principle in the Eichmann case, but the district court
invoked protective jurisdiction as well, on the theory that there is a recognized
connection between the State of Israel and the Jewish people and that the crimes
attributed to Eichmann were "the killing of millions of Jews with intent to exterminate the Jewish people." 36 I.L.R. at 52-54.
62. E.g., Costa Rica, France, Poland, and Spain. Harvard Research, suj,ra note 7,
at 569-70. Mexico and Poland, among others, have asserted universal jurisdiction over
the crime of counterfeiting, id. at 570, although this jurisdiction will, in most cases, be
more accurately classified as protective. See text accompanying notes 28-33 supra.
63. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,
1970, art. 4, [1971] 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, -U.N.T.S.- (already in force in
over 45 countries) provides:
I. Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over the offence and any other act of violence against
passengers or crew committed by the alleged offender in connection with the
offence, in the following cases:
(a) when the offence is committed on board an aircraft registered in that
State; (b) when the aircraft on board which the offense is committed
lands in its territory with the alleged offender still on board; (c) when
the offence is committed on board an aircraft leased without crew to a
lessee who has his principal place of business or, if the lessee has no such
place of business, his permanent residence, in that State.
2. Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary
to establish its jurisdiction over the offence in the case where the alleged
offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him pursuant to
Article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article.
(Emphasis added.) See also Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, art. 5, -U.S.T.-, T.I.A.S. No. 7570,
-U.N.T.S.- (in force in at least 19 countries).
Genocide was denounced as a crime under international law by the United Nations
General Assembly in 1946, but the Genocide Convention adopted by the General
Assembly in 1948 (which came into force in 1951 but has not been ratified by the
United States) provides in art. VI: "Persons charged with genocide or any of the otlter
acts enumerated ••• shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may
have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted
its jurisdiction." Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 2'1'1, 280, 282.
64. The Harvard Research Draft Convention provides for jurisdiction of a state
with respect to a crime committed outside its territory by an alien:
(a) When committed in a place not subject to its authority but subject to the
authority of another State, if the act or omission which constitutes the crime is
also an offence by the law of the place where it was committed, if surrender of
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Some states have also asserted universal jurisdiction over such
offenses as the use of explosives to cause a common danger, traffic in
narcotics or pornography, injury to submarine cables, crimes against
the public health, and injury to international means of communication.66 However, there has been little consensus on these items.
The part of the amendment to the Israeli Offenses Committed
Abroad Law intended to conform to the universality principle, which
is entitled "Offenses against humanity," itself includes only genocide,
Nazi offenses, piracy, certain air navigation offenses, and certain
dangerous drug offenses.66
Thus, not only has membership in a terrorist organization not
been recognized as a proper occasion for the exercise of universal
jurisdiction, but even terrorist acts themselves have not been so recognized. 67 Drafts of the proposed convention on terrorism (which has
not yet even been finalized, much less put into effect) would not cover
the offenses being tried in Israel.68 To base jurisdiction in the current Israeli cases on the universality principle thus would be a sigthe alien for prosecution has been offered to such other State or States and the
offer remains unaccepted, and if prosecution is not barred by lapse of time under
the law of the place where the crime was committed. The penalty imposed shall
in no case be more severe than the penalty prescribed for the same act or omission
by the law of the place where the crime was committed.
(b) When committed in a place not subject to the authority of any State, if
the act or omission which constitutes the crime is also an offence by the law of a
State of which the alien is a national, if surrender of the alien for prosecution has
been offered to the State or States of which he is a national and tlie offer remains
unaccepted, and if prosecution is not barred by lapse of time under the law of
a State of which the alien is a national. The penalty imp_osed shall in no
case be more severe than the penalty prescribed for the same act or omission by
the law of a State of which the alien is a national.
(c) When committed in a place not subject to the authority of any State,
if the crime was committed to the injury of the State assuming jurisdiction, or
one of its nationals, or of a corporation or juristic person having its national
character.
(d) When committed in a place not subject to the authority of any State and the
alien is not a national of any State.
Harvard Research, supra note 7, at 573.

65. Id. at 570-71.
66. Amendment to the Offenses Committed Abroad Law, supra note 5, § 2A (not to
be confused with § 2(A)).
67. The International Law Commission Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace
and Security of Mankind goes beyond the Niimberg Charter and Judgment to the effect
that encouragement of terrorist activities against another state is regarded as an
offense against the peace and security of mankind, but the comments specifically say
that this and certain other offenses can only be committed by the authorities of a
state. Garcia-Mora, supra note 60, at 47.
68. See Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of
International Terrorism and Draft Proposals and Suggestions Submitted to the Three
Sub-Committees of the Whole, in Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International
Terrorism, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 28-33 and 21-23, U.N. Doc, A/9028 (1973). Nor
would the offenses have been covered by the League of Nations Convention for the
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, opened for signature, Nov. 16, 1937, in 7
M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 862 (1941), which never entered into force.
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· nificant and unprecedented expansion of that principle as it is now
recognized.
Clearly the state of Israel is faced with a serious problem posed by
terrorist acts of organizations outside of its territory whose aims are
entirely hostile to the Israeli government-acts that are frequently
not controlled by the states in which the organizations operate. 00
Exercise of expanded extraterritorial jurisdiction should have some
effect in deterring people from joining anti-Israeli terrorist organizations. Similarly, general acceptance of expanded extraterritorial
jurisdiction may have some effect in deterring people from joining
terrorist organizations around the world. However, deterrent effects
are hard to measure, especially effects on determined, if not desperate,
political groups. Nations may, of course, differ in the importance they
attribute to these effects. In deciding whether internationally recognized extraterritorial jurisdiction should be expanded, the benefits of
deterrence must be weighed against other, less desirable effects of
such an expansion.
One effect is the infringement of freedoms that some nations
guarantee their citizens. In the United States, at least, freedom of
association extends to membership in such organizations as the
Black Panthers, the Minutemen, and the Ku Klux Klan, even though
some members of those groups may be guilty of serious crimes.7° For
another country to try someone merely for membership in an
organization in the name of which illegal acts are committed by
others would appear an undesirable form of guilt by association. 71
Other nations may have different legal principles and may legiti69. Even someone accepting Arab claims of the illegality of Israeli reprisals, the
occupation of Arab territory, and even the existence of the Israeli state itself can sec
that Israel has been the object of illegal acts of organizations outside of Israel. It has
been suggested that there is a duty on the part of states to exercise territorial jurisdic•
tion to prevent activities harmful to foreign states. See note 51 supra and accompanying
text. See also Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of
International Terrorism, in Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 28, U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973). For a proposal that a
head of state be held personally liable before an international criminal tribunal for a
state's failure to take sufficient precautions when he has reason to anticipate the
commission of acts of terrorism, see Kutner, Constructive Notice: A Proposal 1'o End
International Terrorism, 19 N.Y.L.F. 325 (1973).
70. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly "pointed out the fallacy of
the suggestion that membership in the Communist Party, or any other political
organization, can be regarded as an alternative, but equivalent, e."pression for a list
of undesirable characteristics •••• Even assuming that Congress had reason to conclude that some Communists would use union positions to bring about political
strikes, 'it cannot automatically be inferred that all members shar[e] their evil purposes
or participat[e] in their illegal conduct.'" United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 455-56
(1965), quoting Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 246 (1957).
71. The crime of conspiracy is, of course, a different matter, as it requires an intent
on the part of the defendant to achieve a certain objective that, under the common
law definition, is the commission of either an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means. W. LAFAVE &: A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 61, at 453 (1972),
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mately forbid membership in specific organizations. However, it
would appear that the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction has
gone too far if one nation can impose those different principles on
people in other nations. It is not difficult to hypothesize a situation
in which an American citizen's membership, while in the United
States, in an organization such as a Latvian exile group, the
American Nazi Party, or the Black Panthers, would violate the law of,
for instance, the Soviet Union, Germany, or South Africa. While it
may be said that, in order to enjoy his membership safely, such a
person need only avoid entering the territory of these countries,72
this suggestion assumes that the individual will know of the foreign
law involved and would, in any case, be a significant burden on international travel.
A second effect of the expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction is
to increase the likelihood of subjecting an individual to penal sanctions for actions he was unlikely to know were illegal. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, provides that "[n]o one shall be held guilty of
any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not
constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the
time when it was committed."73 Presumably, this widely recognized
freedom from ex post facto laws is based on the premise that it is
unjust to try a person for actions that he could not have known
were against the law.74 The same policy would militate against an
expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction to include offenses as indirect in their harmful consequences as a membership in an organization.76 A man may reasonably be expected to know or at least to be
held accountable for the laws in effect in the place where he is (territorial principle), the laws of the state of which he is a citizen (nationality principle), internationally recognized laws (universality
principle), and laws of those states which his actions may clearly and
directly affect (protective principle). However, if either of the last
two categories is greatly expanded, it becomes much less reasonable
to hold someone accountable under them, because of the number and
variety of laws that would then be applicable to him. 76 In today's in72. Such avoidance will not, of course, remove the possibility of jurisdiction in such
a foreign state brought about through an illegal forcible abduction. See discussion
accompanying notes 81-137 infra.
73. G.A. Res. 217 (III), art. 11, § 2, 3 U.N. GAOR, pt. I, at 71, 73, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
74. Crosskey, The True Meaning of the Constitutional Prohibition of Ex-Post-Facto
I.Aws, 14 U. CHI. L. REv. 539, 539 (1947).
75. Of course, while it is impossible for one to know of an ex post facto law, it is
only highly unlikely that an individual will know of broad extraterritorial restraints
imposed by foreign states.
76. Not only is such a situation unfair to the defendant, but there is also no deterrent effect from laws that cannot reasonably be perceived and followed. Defense
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terdependent world, acts may have potential indirect effects in many
of the world's 130-plus nations. To subject someone to the laws of
more than two or three jurisdictions would appear as unjust as to
subject him to ex post facto laws.77
In addition to the substantive dangers described above, the unilateral expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction sets an unfortunate
procedural precedent. Although it may be argued that "new"
customary international law must begin somewhere, and that Israel
is one of a few countries now faced with a terrorist problem, it
would be preferable to expand extraterritorial jurisdiction through
multilateral convention, as was done in the case of the airplane
sabotage and hijacking conventions.78 Indeed, even the customary
universal principles regarding piracy70 and certain war crimes80 have
been codified by such conventions. The existence today of various
counsel in the Bulut case argued that, since the Offenses Commited Abroad Law was
not published outside Israel, the defendant would not know of its existence. Judgment,
supra note 1, at 1. The court replied that the Israeli legal requirements for publication were met and considered any argument that the law had to be published world·
wide to be frivolous. The court further accepted the prosecution's argument that it
could hardly be a complete surprise to the defendant tliat his acts were amenable to
punishment in Israel, because Israel had "warned and warned and warned" the
terrorist organizations and their participants. Id. at 4-5. No doubt knowledge of tlte
illegality in a foreign state of membership in an organization that is directly and
expressly hostile toward that state is more likely than such knowledge with respect to
organizations, such as political parties, that are not so clearly directed. However, it
seems to be unreasonable to expect an individual to know of the illegality in a foreign
state of mere membership in an organization. Beyond noting that Bulut had admitted
knowing the anti-Israeli goals of Al-Fatah, id. at 6, the court gave no indication
that Bulut knew that he had violated Israeli law by his acts and was subject to its
jurisdiction.
77. CJ. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), which dealt with a dc!endant
who had been convicted of failing to register as required by a Los Angeles ordinance
that made it unlawful for any person convicted of an offense punishable as a felony in
California to be or remain in the city more than five days without registering with
the police. The United States Supreme Court held tliat the ordinance in its applica•
tion to a person who was not aware of the registration requirement was a denial of
due process of law. Justice Douglas spoke for the majority: "Where a person did
not know of the duty to register and where there was no proof of the probability of
such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due process, Were it other•
wise, the evil would be as great as it is when the law is written in print too fine to
read or in a language foreign to the community." 355 U.S. at 229-30 (emphasis added).
78. See note 63 supra.
79. Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, art. 19, (1963] 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
80. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 19, [1956] 6 U.S.T. 3114,
T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of tltc
Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 50, (1956] 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 129,
(1956] 6 U.S.T. 3316, T .I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civil Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, [1956]
6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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international fora with nearly universal access makes the treaty
method of altering the international law of jurisdiction a practical
one. In such fora objections to unwarranted expansions can be
voiced, and no expansion of jurisdiction will be approved that unduly burdens freedoms guaranteed by any major legal system. Nations can discuss the delicate but important balancing between interests of state security and of individual freedoms, without the random, action-and-reaction effect inherent in unilateral attempts to
expand customary international law. It may be true that, at present,
no international forum would approve the current Israeli extension
of extraterritorial jurisdiction, but that merely emphasizes the unacceptability of these precedents to major legal systems such as the
American system.
If Israel unilaterally extends protective or universal jurisdiction
to offenses of membership in organizations, why could not other
nations similarly extend extraterritorial jurisdiction to acts of a
different nature? Statements, political contributions, or acts of economic significance as simple as deciding where to invest may be
deemed by one country or another to violate its new conception of
international law or to harm its security interests. Such extensions
could result again in trials as lacking in safeguards to individual
liberty as trials based on ex post facto laws and, ultimately, in severe
practical restrictions on foreign travel. In addition, the expansion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction beyond the minimum necessary to preserve a state's security or to curb delicta juris gentium may, through
infringement of the sovereignty of other states, lead to friction among
nations. The result would be to undermine the international peace
that international law is intended to foster.
In short, the precedent being set in Israel opens a Pandora's Box.
It is questionable whether the deterrent value of such trials is worth
their costs.
The second issue raised by the trials of Bulut and the ten
fedayeen is whether Israel's exercise of jurisdiction over them is consistent with international law despite the fact that they were forcibly
abducted.81 Any argument that Israeli courts do not have jurisdiction
because custody was so obtained, however, must contend with
numerous precedents82 that support the principle of male captus,
bene detentus-an illegal apprehension does not preclude jurisdiction. The court in the Bulut case relied on this line of authority to
81. Judgment, supra note I, at l; TIME MAGAZINE, Aug. 20, 1973, at 31.
82. Helpful surveys of the cases are found in I. SHEARER, EXTRADmON IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 72-76 (1971); Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State over Fugitives

Brought from a Foreign Country by Force or Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32 IND.
L.J. 427, 430-46 (1957); O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Extradition, 36 BRIT.
Y.B, INTL, L. 279 (1960); Sponsler, International Kidnapping, 5 INTL. LAw. 27
(1971).
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reject the contention that Bulut should not be tried because he was
brought to Israel involuntarily and without extradition.88
The primary American precedent is Ker v. lllinois.84 Ker was
tried in Illinois for larceny committed in that state, after having been
kidnapped in Peru and brought to the United States against his will.
The American who took Ker into custody had the proper extradition
papers with him when he arrived in Lima but did not present them
to any officer of the Peruvian government or make any demand on
that government for Ker's surrender. He forcibly brought Ker to
San Francisco, whereupon Ker was extradited to Illinois.au The Court
rejected Ker's argument that the proceeding had been in violation of
his rights under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.86
Counsel for Ker relied primarily, however, on a treaty between
Peru and the United States to argue that he could not be tried in
the United States. 87 The Court, first, found that the case was not
covered by a treaty right of asylum and, second, distinguished
United States v. Rauscher,88 which held that a defendant properly
surrendered under an extradition treaty could be tried for no offense
other than the one for which he was delivered under the extradition
proceedings.89 The distinction was that in Ker the pertinent extradition treaty "was not called into operation, was not relied upon, was
not made the pretext of arrest, and ... it was a clear case of kidnapping within the dominions of Peru, without any pretence of
authority under the treaty ...." 99 The theory of the distinction was
that Rauscher was "clothed with the protection which the ... true
construction of the treaty gave him" 91 and that the United States
therefore had a treaty obligation to Great Britain to try him for no
crime other ,than the one for which he was extradited. But, since no
83. Judgment, supra note I, at 5-6,
84. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
85. 119 U.S. at 438-39. A fact of the case that was available to the Court but was
not mentioned in its opinion was that the Peruvian government had at the time only
a nominal existence in the mountains 85 miles from Lima. Lima was occupied by
Chilean forces, and the military governor of Lima had dispatched an officer to assist
the American messenger in putting Ker on his way back to the United States. Fairman,
Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 AM. J. INTL. L. 678, 685 (1953).
86. "We do not intend to say that there may not be proceedings previous to the
trial, in regard to which the prisoner could invoke in some manner the provisions of
[the due process clause], but ••• we do not think he is entitled to say that he should
not be tried at all for the crime with which he is charged in a regular indictment,"
119 U.S. at 440.
87. 119 U.S. at 441.
88. 119 U.S. 40'1 (1886), decided the same day as Ker, also with a majority opinion

by Justice Miller.
89. 119 U.S. at 443.
90. 119 U.S. at 443. But see note 85 supra.
91. 119 U.S. at 443.

April 1974]

Notes

1105

treaty between the United States and Peru had been invoked, the
United States had no such obligation to Peru with regard to Ker.92
Therefore, he was entitled to no protection under the treaty.
Apart from the due process and treaty issues, the Ker Court declined, on the ground that the question was not a federal one, to
consider whether customary international law would preclude trial
in a state court following a forcible abduction.98 However, the Court
did cite authority for the statement that "such forcible abduction is
no sufficient reason why the party should not answer when brought
within the jurisdiction of the court which has the right to try him
for such an offence, and presents no valid objection to his trial in
such court. " 94
Despite its limited holding and peculiar fact situation, Ker has
been relied on extensively for the principle that forcible abduction
does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction. For example, in response to a Mexican request for the return of one Martinez, who had
been improperly brought into the United States in order to stand
trial for an offense against the laws of California, the United States
relied on Ker to maintain that "the irregularity in the manner of
bringing the defendant within the jurisdiction was not a defense
which could be pleaded as a valid bar to trial for a crime upon a
regular indictment . . . ." 95 The United States noted also that
Martinez's kidnapper had been surrendered to the government of
Mexico.96
More recently, in Frisbie v. Collins, 91 an interstate forcible abduction case,98 the Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed Ker. 99
92, The Ker Court noted that "it is quite a different case [from Rauscher] when
the plaintiff in error comes to this country in the manner in which [Ker] was brought
here, clothed with no rights which a proceeding under the treaty could have given
him, and no duty which this country owes to Peru or to him under the treaty." 119
U.S. at 443.
93. 119 U.S. at 444.
94. 119 U.S. at 444.
95. Letter from the Acting Secretary of State to the Mexican Charge, [1906] 2
FOREIGN REI.. U.S. 1121-22 (1909).
96. Id. It was also noted that "the prosecution of Martinez appears to be proceeding in the courts of the State of California, which are independent of the Federal
Executive." Id.
97. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
98. While living in Chicago, Collins was allegedly forcibly seized, handcuffed,
blackjacked, and taken to Michigan, where he was convicted of murder. 342 U.S. at
520. The offense presumably occurred in Michigan. Collins v. Frisbie, 189 F.2d 464,
465 (6th Cir. 1951). Professor Sponsler has distinguished interstate cases from international cases on the basis that considerations in international cases of the disruption
of the certainty of the flow of commerce and of the protection of individual rights are
lacking in interstate cases. Sponsler, supra note 82, at 45. In addition, violation of national sovereignty is not an issue in interstate cases.
99. This Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v. Illinois
• • • that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the
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Despite criticism of the Ker doctrine,100 federal courts of appeals have
continued to follow Frisbie and the Ker doctrine. 101
The authoritative English case, cited with approval in Ker, is Ex
parte Scott,1°2 in which the defendant was held on the charge of
perjury, a misdemeanor, despite the fact that she had been apprehended by a British police officer in Brussels and conveyed to
England.103 Scott was followed in several later cases, notably Ex parte
Elliott,104 in which Lord Goddard noted that, if an abducted defendant "has been arrested in a foreign country and detained improperly from the time that he was first arrested until the time he
lands in this country, he may have a remedy against the persons who
arrested and detained him, but that does not entitle him to be discharged, though it may influence the court if they think there was
something irregular or improper in the arrest." 105
fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a
"forcible abduction." No persuasive reasons are now presented to justify overruling
this line of cases. They rest on the sound basis that due process of law is satis•
fied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly
apprized of the charges against hiil1 and after a fair trial in accordance with
constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing 1n the Constitution that
requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice
because he was brought to trial against his will.
342 U.S. at 522, The Court also cited In re Johnson, 167 U.S. 120 (1897) (even though
U.S. Marshal's arrest in Indian Territory of defendant for rape committed within the
Territory was illegal, because the U.S. Court for the Eastern District of Texas had
"acquired jurisdiction," subsequent indictment and trial Within the Territory were
valid), and two interstate cases, Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. '100 (1888), and Lascelles v.
Georgia, 148 U.S. 537 (1893). In In re Johnson the Supreme Court explained why the
Ker doctrine applies in criminal cases, while in a civil case if a defendant is brought
into the jurisdiction by trick, service of process is invalid: "The law will not permit a
person to be kidnapped or decoyed within the jurisdiction for the purpose of being
compelled to answer to a mere private claim, but in criminal cases the interests of the
public override that which is, after all, a mere privilege from arrest." 167 U.S. at 126,

100. Judge Friendly has noted that "Frisbie v. Collins arose on an application £or
federal habeas corpus filed many years after Collins' state trial at which no objection
appears to have been raised, and the Court's opinion has overtones of the historic
limitation of habeas corpus to jurisdictional matters which was to be repudiated at
the next term in Brown v. Allen ••• ," United States v. Edmons, 4ll2 F,2d 5'1'7, 583
(2d Cir. 1970).
101. See United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d '144 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936
(1973), involving charges of conspiracy and theft of U.S. Government property
(negotiating worthless checks at American PX's in Japan) against two U.S. citizens
who were forcibly abducted from the Republic of Viet Nam to the United States: and
cases therein at 748 n.10. But see United States v. Toscanino, No. '13--2732 (2d Cir.,
May 15, 1974).
102, 115 Eng. Rep. 116 (K.B. 1829).
103. Lord Tenterden distinguished between civil and criminal proceedings, but
refused to distinguish between misdemeanors and felonies in concluding that the
court could not inquire into "the circumstances under which she was brought
here." 115 Eng. Rep, at 167.
104. [1949] 1 All. E.R. 373 (K.B.). This was a habeas corpus proceeding involving
a British corporal, charged with desertion, who left the country one day before his
compassionate leave expired. He was arrested two years later in Belgium by British
officers; the officers were accompanied by two Belgian police officers, but the arrest was
in a manner contrary to Belgian law.
105. [1949] 1 All. E.R. at 376. It has been argued that, although a British court
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Cases in other British Commonwealth jurisdictions have also
adopted the doctrine. In a South African case, Abrahams v. Minister
of ]ustice,106 an application for habeas corpus was dismissed on the
basis of "clear precedent ... that once there is a lawful detention,
the circumstances of the arrest an:d capture are irrelevant."107 However, the court noted the Minister of Justice's statement that the
petitioner and his three companions would be returned to Bechuanaland "in order to preserve friendly relations ·with neighboring
States ...." 108 In a Palestinian case, Afouneh v. Attorney General,1° 9
Afouneh, accused of murder in Palestine, had been arrested in
Damascus, Syria, and conveyed to the Palestinian border by members
of the Palestine police force. Proper extradition papers arrived in
Syria after the forcible abduction. The court relied on Ex parte
Scott and Moore's Digest of International Law (which cited Ker) to
hold that Afouneh could not "set up in answer to the indictment the
unlawful manner in which he was brought within the jurisdiction of
the court. It belongs exclusively to the government from whose
territory he was wrongfully taken to complain of the violation of
its rights."110
In addition, cases from Belgiumm and Germany112 hold that
domestic courts will not review the regularity of a foreign extradition.
By contrast, two French cases have not followed the Ker doctrine. In Case of N ollet,118 a Belgian fugitive from France was arrested in Belgium by French authorities and turned over to the Belgian police, who, thinking he was French, turned him over to the
French authorities at the border. The court reasoned that the defendant would not be before the court at all if the French authoriwill probably exercise jurisdiction over a criminal brought before it in violation of
international law, no precedent binds any British court to adopt this view. O'Higgins,
supra note 82, at 319. This conclusion is based on the view that all the British pre•
cedents dealt with arrests illegal under British or foreign domestic law and did not
consider international law. O'Higgins, supra, at 282-89.
106. £1963] 4 S. Afr. L.R. 542. The petitioner was allegedly abducted from
Bechuanaland Protectorate to South West Africa by six people, including some South
African police, and arrested on a charge under the Suppression of Communism Act.
107. [1963] 4 S. Afr. L.R. at 545.
108. [1963] 4 S. Afr. L.R. at 544-45.
109. [1941-42] Ann. Dig. 327 (No. 97) (Supreme Court of Palestine sitting as a Court
of Criminal Appeal, 1942).
110. {1941-42] Ann. Dig. at 328.
Ill. Geldof v. Meulemeester and Steffen, 31 I.L.R. 385 (Cour de Cassation, 1961)
(defendant extradited from The Netherlands on basis of request submitted two days
after deadline established by treaty).
112. Extradition CTurisdiction) Case, [1935-37] Ann. Dig. 348 (No. 165) (Supreme
Court of the Reich, 1936) (appellant fraudfeasor's plea interpreted by court to be allegation that the conditioned extradition from Switzerland to Germany, following extra•
dition from France to Switzerland, was illegal).
ml. 18 JOURNAL DU D11.orr INTEII.NATIONAL 1188 (Cour d'appel de Douai, 1891).
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ties had not violated the Belgian border and held that it was as
though the arrest never occurred at all. The defendant was released. Similarly, in In re ]olis, 114 a Belgian subject accused of theft
in France was arrested in Belgium and brought back to France by
two French officials. In ordering immediate release, the court held
that the arrest and therefore all subsequent proceedings were
"completely null and void."116 No other jurisdiction has been found
to follow the French example.116
Although Anglo-American and Palestinian precedent carry great
weight in Israel,117 Israeli precedent in the Eichmann 118 decisions, in
so far as it is relevant, is entitled to the greatest weight. Nazi war
criminal Adolf Eichmann had been kidnapped in Argentina, allegedly by agents of the Israeli government, and forcibly brought
to Israel.119 Counsel for Eichmann contended that "the prosecution
of the accused in Israel following his abduction from a foreign
country conflicts with international law and exceeds the jurisdiction
of the Court."120 The Israeli district court dealt extensively with
British, American, and Palestinian precedent, particularly Scott, Ker,
Afouneh, and State v. Brewster,121 an early Vermont case cited with
approval in Ker. 122 The court concluded that
in so far as Argentina's sovereignty has been impaired "the incident
has been closed," and thereupon the episode of the kidnapping of
114. [1933-34] Ann. Dig. 191 (No. 77) (Tribunal Correctionnel d'Avcsnes, 1933).
115. [1933-34] Ann. Dig. at 191.
116. More recently, the principle has been limited even in France to irregular
seizure carried out by officials in disregard of e.xtradition treaties or laws. In the
1964 Cour de Cassation case of Argoud, the defendant was captured in Germany by
unknown persons and found trussed and gagged inside French territory by French
police, who had no knowledge of him until an anonymous telephone call led them to
him. In permitting the exercise of jurisdiction, the court distinguished between a
"disguised extradition" carried out by officials and an abduction carried out by private
persons. I. SHEARER, supra note 82, at 74.
117. See Gorney, Amerkan Precedent in the Supreme Court of Israel, 68 HARV.
L. R.Ev. 1194 (1955).
118. Attorney General v. Eichmann, 36 IL.R. 18 (Dist. Ct., Israel, 1961), affd., 36
I.L.R. 277 (Supreme Court of Israel sitting as a Court of Criminal Appeal, 1962),
119. Argentina lodged a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations;
in response, a resolution (S.C. Res. 138, U.N. Doc. S/4349 CTune 23, 1960)) was passed,
requesting "the Government of Israel to make appropriate reparation in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international law" and expressing "the hope that the traditionally friendly relations between Argentina and
Israel will be advanced." 36 I.L.R. at 58. Pursuant to this resolution the two governments issued a joint communique on August 3, 1960, resolving "to regard as closed the
incident which arose out of the action taken by citizens of Israel, which infringed the
fundamental rights of the State of Argentina." 36 I.L.R. at 59.
120. 36 IL.R. at 23.
121. 7 Vt. 118 (1835) (Canadian national held subject to Vermont jurisdiction after
being forcibly brought back from Canada to stand trial for theft in Vermont).
122. 36 I.L.R. at 59-71. In re Jolis, discussed in text accompanying notes 114-Jv
supra, was cited as the only conflicting precedent the court could find. 36 I.L.R. at 68,
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the accused passed from the level of international law to the level of
municipal law . . . . In view of the settlement of the incident
between the two countries before trial brought, judgment may without hesitation be based on the continuous line of British, Palestinian
and American case law, beginning with Ex parte Scott and going on
to Frisbie v. Collins and after.
• . . [T]here is no immunity for a fugitive offender save in the one
and only case where he has been extradited by the asylum State to
the requesting State for a specific offence, which is not the offence
for which he was being tried.128

On appeal, it was also contended that each of the authorities on
which the district court had relied dealt with an offender who had
fled from the area of jurisdiction of a court that was already competent to try him at the time he committed his offense, whereas such
was not the case with Eichmann. The Supreme Court of Israel rejected this argument by noting that "since the crimes attributed to
him are of an international character and have been condemned
publicly by the civilized world . . . by virtue of the principle of
universal jurisdiction, every country has the right to try him."124
As the Israeli district court recognized,125 there has been considerable criticism of the Ker doctrine. The distinction126 between
Ker, where an extradition treaty was ignored, and United States v.
Rauscher, where the Court held that a fugitive properly extradited
for one offense could not be tried for another, has been termed
"arbitrary" and "unsound."127 Professor Dickinson has argued that
"[t]he same reasoning which enabled the extradited fugitive in
United States v. Rauscher to invoke the treaty to his own advantage,
'in good faith to the country which has sent him here,' should have
enabled the kidnapped fugitive to invoke international law in good
faith to Peru."128
It has been argued that "courts have been misled by the wide and
general phraseology" of cases such as Ker, which was arguably decided on the basis that there was no violation of international law.129
Occasional decisions of municipal courts "thus cannot be said to
123. 36 I.L.R. at 70-71, 76.
124. 36 l.L.R. at 306 (emphasis original).
125. 36 I.L.R. at 68-70.
126. See text accompanying notes 88-91 supra.
127. Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following Seizure or Arrest in Violation of International Law, 28 AM. J. INTL. L. 231, 244 (1934).
128. Id. at 238.
129. Morgenstern, Jurisdiction in Seizures Effected in Violation of International iAw,
29 BRIT. Y.B. INTL. L. 265, 269-70 (1952). Ker was arguably delivered over , to the
American messenger with the consent and assistance of the de facto authorities. See
note 85 supra.
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affect the principle, affirmed in []olis], that an arrest in violation of
international law can have no legal effect. "180 The Israeli district
court met these criticisms by noting that "the critics admit • • • the
established rule ...." 131
The Ker doctrine recently has also been severely challenged in
the United States. In United States v. Toscanino,182 the Second Circuit held that a defendant who allegedly had been kidnapped in
Uruguay, tortured, and forcibly brought to the United States, where
he was convicted on a narcotics charge, would be entitled to release
if he could produce evidence of his allegations on remand. The court
noted that the due process clause has evolved in meaning since Ker
and Frisbie. The Supreme Court decisions in Mapp v. Ohio183 and
Rochin v. California134 had added to the requirement of a procedurally fair trial a requirement that the accused be protected from
illegal pre-trial conduct of law enforcement authorities. Applying the
rationale of Mapp and Rochin-that deterring illegal police conduct
requires that the fruit of the conduct not be used to convict the victim of the conduct-the court held that there could be no jurisdiction over a defendant brought into custody by illegal forcible abduction. Toscanino presents a stronger case for the "exclusionary
rule" than even Mapp or Rochin, for officers can be prosecuted in the
United States for domestic wrongdoing, but apprehension of international kidnappers by the state of refuge may be impossible.
Finding jurisdiction after forcible abduction may significantly
encourage such internationally illegal abduction. If extradition, the
internationally recognized method of getting custody, is unavailable
for any reason, kidnapping provides a simple solution. Kidnapping is
not deterred, not only because the fugitive will certainly stand trial,
but also because there is very little threat of judicial punishment of
the kidnappers, who, no doubt, will be returned to the state of refuge
for trial only in rare circumstances.
The question becomes whether the social cost of the encouragement of such kidnapping is worth the deterrent value of trying those
offenders who cannot be extradited. Aside from the abstract con130. Id. at 27.
131. 36 I.L.R. at 68.
132. No. 73-2732 (2d Cir., May 15, 1974).
133. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
134. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Rochin held that the due process clause requires that a
state court conviction resting on evidence obtained through police brutality be set
aside, and Mapp interpreted the clause as requiring the application of the exclusionary rule to state prosecutions, so that evidence obtained by illegal search and
seizure by state officers could not be admitted in a criminal trial of the person from
whom it had been seized. The Toscanino court also relied on Judge Friendly's dissent
in United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1970). Also, Toscanino, unlike Kar
and Frisbie, involved the violation of a treaty obligation, and therefore fell within
the rule of United States v. Rauscher, ll9 U.S. 407 (1886). See text accompanying
notes 87-92 supra.
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tention that forcible abduction violates national sovereignty, its
encouragement would undermine the international and domestic
law of extradition, which provides certain safeguards for human
rights. These safeguards include a mandatory hearing185 and the
general unavailability of extradition for political offenses136 and for
offenses not criminal in the extraditing state.187 A weakening of
extradition standards would be a retreat from the ordered relations
among nations that are the goal of international law. The current
Israeli cases thus encourage international kidnapping and consequently undermine international safeguards.
However, a total repudiation of the Ker doctrine is not necessary
to support the conclusion that jurisdiction should be precluded in
the current Israeli cases. Unlike the current cases, Ker, Frisbie, Scott,
Afouneh, and Eichmann all involved offenses such as larceny, murder, perjury, or war crimes, which presumably were crimes also in
the states of refuge, and which were not "political" crimes.188 Those
offenses were thus of a kind widely recognized as extraditable, assuming a treaty,189 while the offense of belonging to Al-Fatah is not a
crime in Lebanon and is arguably a "political" offense. While this
distinction may lead one to conclude that there is, therefore, more
reason to find Israeli jurisdiction, because kidnapping would be the
only practical method of bringing the offender into custody, the
distinction more logically cuts the other way. International extradition exemptions and safeguards are widely accepted presumably
because individual nations find policy reasons to support them.140
These policy objectives are threatened more, it may be argued, when
jurisdiction is exercised where extradition is forbidden, than where
extradition is possible but merely bypassed.
In addition, it may have been implicit in the Ker doctrine cases
that preclusion of jurisdiction because of forcible abduction would
135. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1970). The laws of most non-Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions reject the production of evidence of guilt at such hearings and look only to proof
of identity and the conformity of the request to treaty and statutory requirements,
I. SHEARER, supra note 82, at 157.
136. See 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 799-857 (1968); I. SHEARER,
supra note 82, at 166-69.
137, See 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 136, at 773-79; I. SHEARER, supra note 82, at
137-41.
UIS. On the question of whether war crimes are "political," see I. SHEARER, supra
note 82, at 185-87.
139. See sources cited in notes 136-37 supra.
140. A nation may pride itself on being a place of political asylum, and purely
political offenders do not generally present a threat to life or property in other states.
I. SHEARER, supra note 82, at 188. The double-criminality safeguard prevents a person's
libeny from being restricted because of offenses not recognized as criminal by the
state of his residence, in addition to preventing the embarrassment of the "social conscience" of the state "by an obligation to extradite a person who would not, according
to its own standards, be guilty of acts deserving punishment." I. SHEARER, supra, at
137-38.
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merely be a waste of time and energy, because the government might
then simply extradite properly. Such a notion would, of course, not
apply in cases where extradition is completely unavailable. 141
A further distinction bettveen the Ker doctrine cases and the
current Israeli cases is that attempted by the defense in the Eichmann
cases: 142 In Ker, Frisbie, Scott, and Afouneh, the offenses had been
committed in areas subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the state
to which the fugitive was returned, whereas Eichmann had never
been in Israel. It might be more justifiable to try someone who was
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court at the time of the
offense than to assert jurisdiction over one who has never been within
that jurisdiction. The Israeli supreme court in Eichmann met this
contention by pointing out the "international character" of Eichmann's crimes.148 Criticisms of the Ker doctrine144 aside, jurisdiction
may be justified despite forcible abduction in cases where universal
jurisdiction is relied upon. But in the current cases, which purport
to rely on the protective principle, there is neither a crime of an
"international character," nor is it alleged that the offenders committed crimes within the territory of Israel prior to abduction. Also,
the offenders are not nationals of Israel.146 Thus, a preclusion of
jurisdiction on account of forcible abduction would not require an
overruling of Eichmann.146 Indeed, the exercise of jurisdiction in the
instant cases is an extension of the much-criticized Ker doctrine from
cases where substantive jurisdiction was based on the territorial,
universality, or nationality principle to cases where jurisdiction is
based on the protective principle-the principle that provides the
least likelihood of fair warning to possible offenders.
Although, conceptually, the expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction after forcible abduction involve the infringement of a state's sovereignty, it is individual human
rights that are ultimately affected. Despite assertions by both Israeli
courts in Eichmann that the question of substantive Israeli jurisdiction and the question of immunity because of kidnapping were
"entirely separate,"147 the way in which either one of these questions
141. Apart from the safeguards mentioned, Israel Jacks regular extradition pro•
cedures with its Arab neighbors. TIME MAGAZINE, Aug. 20, 1973, at 31.
142. See text accompanying note 124 supra.
143. 36 I.L.R. at 306 (emphasis original).
144. See text accompanying notes 125-37.
145. Nationality thus does not provide jurisdiction as it arguably does in United
States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973), discussed in
note 101 supra.
146. A further distinction between the recent cases and the Eichmann case derives
from the fact that, with regard to the impairment of Argentine sovereignty, the
Eichmann incident was diplomatically "closed," see text accompanying note 123 supra,
while there has been no such diplomatic "closing" of Israeli incursions into Lebanon.
147. 36 I.L.R. at 23, 307.
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is answered seriously affects the human rights policy analysis of the
other. The policy implicit in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, that an individual must be held accountable only for compliance with laws of which he can reasonably become aware,"' can be
implemented by limiting extradition as well as by limiting extraterritorial jurisdiction. The more one is limited, the less compelling
becomes the reason to limit the other. If protective or universal
jurisdiction is to be greatly expanded, the policy behind making
extradition unavailable for political crimes 40 or for offenses not
criminal in the extraditing state'O becomes much stronger. Furthermore, any strong policy behind a limitation of extradition a fortiori
strengthens the policy against any circumvention of extradition
rules.' 5' Thus, the more extraterritorial jurisdiction is expanded,
the less should illegal apprehension be encouraged. This interrelation has been reflected in France, the country that has asserted the
most far-reaching protective jurisdiction, but also the one country
whose courts have rejected the Ker doctrine. If the protective or
universality principles are expanded, the argument against use of
the Ker doctrine becomes much stronger. If jurisdiction is exercised
despite forcible abduction, the argument against unprecedented expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in turn is strengthened.
Thus, the exercise of jurisdiction over Bulut, and later over the
ten fedayeen, on the basis of an expanded protective (or universal)
jurisdiction and on the basis of the Ker doctrine of jurisdiction
despite forcible abduction is, in each respect and particularly in combination, a precedent harmful both'to the order of the international
system and to individual human rights.

